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Judges, Lawyers, and a Predictive Theory of Legal Complexity
Benjamin H. Barton 1
This Article uses public choice theory and the “new institutionalism” to discuss the
incentives, proclivities, and shared backgrounds of lawyers and judges. In America
every law-making judge has a single unifying characteristic, each is a former lawyer.
This shared background has powerful and unexplored effects on the shape and structure
of American law. This Article argues that the shared characteristics, thought-processes,
training, and incentives of Judges and lawyers lead inexorably to greater complexity in
judge-made law. These same factors lead to the following prediction: judge-created law
will be most complex in areas where a) elite lawyers regularly practice; b) judges may
have a personal preference in the case that can be written-around by way of legal
complexity; and c) the subject area interests the judge, or is generally considered
prestigious. The Article uses the law of standing as a case study.

This is the Court of Chancery, which has its decaying houses and its blighted lands in
every shire, which has its worn out lunatic in every madhouse and its dead in every
churchyard, which has its ruined suitor with his slipshod heels and threadbare dress
borrowing and begging through the round of every man’s acquaintance, which gives to
monied might the means abundantly of wearing out the right, which so exhausts finances,
patience, courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and breaks the heart, that there is not an
honorable man among its practitioners who would not give – who does not often give –
the warning, ‘Suffer any wrong that can be done you rather than come here!
-- Charles Dickens, Bleak House
The broadest judicial bias I see . . . is the bias in favor of legal complexity. The volumes
of the third edition of the Federal Reporter spread themselves like Kudzu vine over the
shelves of law libraries.
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-- The Honorable Dennis Jacobs, Chief Judge United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit

In recent years political scientists, economists and law professors have begun
exploring two separate areas of inquiry: legal complexity and judicial incentives and
behavior. This Article combines on these topics and uses an institutional analysis of legal
thinking to offer a predictive theory of judge-made legal complexity. My theory thus
does not address the entire topic of legal complexity – authors like Peter Schuck (Schuck
1992) and Richard Epstein (Epstein 1995) have focused on complexity within the entire
legal system, including legislators, bureaucrats, and the judiciary. Instead, I focus on a
very specific type of legal complexity: the type created by judges with the help of
lawyers. In particular I focus on what I call indeterminate complexity, by which I mean
complexity which adds to, rather than clarifies, indeterminacy. 2
I use public choice theory and the “new institutionalism” to discuss the incentives,
proclivities, and shared backgrounds of lawyers and judges. In America every lawmaking judge has a single unifying characteristic, regardless of their political affiliation,
judicial philosophy, race, gender, or religion. Every American judge is a former lawyer.
This shared background has powerful and unexplored effects on the shape and structure
of American law. This Article argues that the shared characteristics, thought-processes,
training, and incentives of Judges and lawyers lead inexorably to greater complexity in
judge-made law. These same factors lead to the following prediction: judge-created law
will be most complex in areas where a) elite lawyers regularly practice; b) judges may
have a personal preference in the case that can be written-around by way of legal

2

As I will discuss below, not all complexity fits this description. Some complexity adds granularity and
particularity to the law, reducing indeterminacy.
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complexity; and c) the subject area interests the judge, or is generally considered
prestigious. In the interests of brevity I choose a single area of law – standing – as my
case study, but there are many alternative examples. 3
The Article proceeds as follows. Part 1 places this work in context with my
earlier treatments of lawyers and judges. Part 2 defines the legal complexity at issue and
canvasses some of the previous work in the area. Part 3 describes the institutional
characteristics and internal incentives of both the legal profession and the law-making
judiciary: who they are, their career and educational experiences, what they do, and what
incentives drive their behavior. Part 3 then uses this institutional analysis to state why
both lawyers and law-making judges tend to favor complexity. Part 4 offers the law of
standing as a case study in judge-made complexity.
1.

THE LAWYER-JUDGE HYPOTHESIS
In recent years I have spent a great deal of time applying the tools of public

choice theory and the new institutionalism to American judges and lawyers. In America
almost all judges are formerly lawyers, and the central insight of my work has been that
this has powerful, and in some cases insalubrious, effects on the shape of American law.
In my first foray into this area I limited myself to the regulation of the legal
profession itself. In America the regulation of lawyers is exclusively controlled by State
Supreme Courts. As a general rule State Supreme Courts claim this power as a result of
separation of powers doctrine and their “inherent authority” over the practice of law. The
exercise of this authority has wide-ranging consequences: both the rules of entry and
3

Much of Federal Constitutional law fits the theory. Another example is the federal law of employment
discrimination. State law and precedents have dealt with wrongful discharge cases for years, and offer a
relatively simple procedural and substantive framework. By comparison federal employment
discrimination law has grown more and more arcane over the years, with a multistep procedure for
presenting the proof and tangled substantive law. (Long 2006).
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rules of professional conduct for the legal profession are controlled in the final instance
by lawyers themselves. Since virtually every other profession is governed by state
legislatures, this is a substantial regulatory advantage for lawyers. (Barton 2001; Barton
2003).
Consistent with the dictates of public choice theory, this advantage has played out
to the benefit of the legal profession as a whole and to the detriment of the public.
Collective action problems, agency capture, and rent-seeking are even more pronounced
in lawyer regulation than in other areas, because of the confluence of interests between
judges and lawyers, and the lack of public knowledge or power to address the situation.
(Barton 2003).
More recently I have stretched the theory beyond the results in regulation to case
specific areas where judges have clearly favored the interests of the legal profession over
the public. My lawyer-judge hypothesis posited that whenever a legal issue impinges
upon the interests of the legal profession as a whole judges tend to choose the result that
benefits lawyers. Some of the cases I analyzed are a result of judges looking out for their
own, but more often the cases result from a judge’s innate sympathy and empathy for the
alleged plight of lawyers. So, for example, the lawyer client relationship is powerfully
protected in legal proceedings by the lawyer-client privilege, the oldest and strongest of
the evidentiary privileges. By comparison the doctor-patient or priest-penitent privileges
are much weaker. Similarly, legal malpractice claims are among the hardest types of
torts to win. In most legal malpractice cases a plaintiff must prove a “case within a case”
to satisfy the element of causation. Thus, the plaintiff must establish not only negligence;
she must also establish that “but for” the negligence she would have won (and collected
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on) the underlying case at trial. By contrast, in many states a patient can recover against
a doctor for a “lost chance” of survival regardless of whether the doctor’s error was the
“but for” cause of death. (Barton 2007).
In this Article I add another, broader layer to my argument that the tight
connection between lawyers and judges has significant and costly real world
consequences. This Article argues that the unique relationship and similarity of
backgrounds, skills, and incentives of lawyers and judges leads them to work together to
increase legal complexity.
2.

LEGAL COMPLEXITY
Before launching into the argument it is necessary to first define legal complexity

and then briefly describe some of its costs and benefits. We start with definitions.
2.1

Defining Legal Complexity

Ironically, past legal definitions of complexity have themselves tended towards
convolution. For example, Peter Schuck describes legal complexity across four axes –
density, complexity, institutional differentiation, and indeterminacy. (Schuck 1992, p.4).
Deborah Paul uses three criteria – complication, intractability, and incoherence. (Paul
1997, pp.157-62). Richard Epstein offers a definition that defines complexity in terms of
the public and private costs of compliance with any rule. (Epstein 1995, pp. 25-26).
By comparison, consider Louis Kaplow’s relatively straightforward statement that
“the relative complexity of legal rules refers to the number and difficulty of distinctions
the rules make.” (Kaplow 1995, p.150). 4 This simpler definition will work fine for our
purposes.

4

This definition jibes nicely with non-legal definitions, like John Casti’s definition that “the complexity of
an object is directly proportional to the length of its shortest possible description.” (Casti 1994, p.9).
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It is also important to clarify exactly the type of complexity at issue. First, I am
only discussing judge-made law, so I make no effort to discuss complexity that results
from legislative, executive, bureaucratic actions. Except for the actions of lawyers and
clients in court, I am also ignoring complexity that arises from private ordering.
In particular this Article focuses on what I call the law-making courts, in
comparison to law-applying courts. The classic law-making courts are the U.S. and State
Supreme Courts. 5 To a lesser extent the various Federal and State Courts of Appeal also
regularly make law. 6 District courts at the Federal and state level are considered lawapplying courts. This is not to say that these courts do not have substantial (and in some
cases largely unfettered) discretion to make law in any given case, or that these courts do
not add to the overall complexity of the system. Instead, it is the nature of precedent, and
the likelihood that a written, published decision by a court will affect existing or create
new law that separates the law-making from the law-applying courts. 7
Second, I am trying to isolate what I call indeterminate complexity. I add the
modifier “indeterminate” because in some areas of the law complexity may be
appropriate and helpful. While legal complexity often has negative connotations
(consider Epstein 1995), economists and others have noted that complexity carries both
strengths and weaknesses. (Kaplow 1995, pp. 151-52). Complexity can allow the law to
be more closely tailored to very specific cases, and if the area of law is one where it is

5

Posner has gone so far as to argue recently that the U.S. Supreme Court’s caseload and approach makes
the Court an essentially legislative body. (Posner 2005).
6
I say “to a lesser extent” not because these courts produce less law (they actually produce much more),
but because they are not courts of last resort, so they tend to create less far-reaching law.
7
Separating these courts, and their various institutional backgrounds, incentives and proclivities is one of
the key additions this Article offers, as most previous studies of legal complexity have focused on the
interests and actions of the judiciary as a whole, instead of considering the great differences between each
level of the judiciary, and how much more opportunity Supreme Courts have to add complexity and how
little of the costs they bear for any such addition.
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critical to have very precise calibration, complexity is often necessary, even if not
necessarily efficient.
If it’s helpful, think of two separate continuums for judge-created law. One
continuum considers whether the law is relatively simple or complex. The second
considers whether the law is relatively determinate or indeterminate. As Schuck has
noted, these types of calculations are not black and white. (Schuck 1992). Any area of
the law will fall somewhere on these continuums.
Moreover, being at an extreme of one continuum does not necessarily determine
placement on the other. For example, simple rules can be determinate or indeterminate.
Our courts could operate based on a single statement: “all disputes will be decided
fairly.” This statement is exceedingly simple, but would be woefully indeterminate in
practice. By comparison, rules stating the legal age for drinking or voting are simple and
determinate.
Similarly, complex systems can be determinate or indeterminate. Many IRS and
EPA regulations are attempts to use complexity to increase determinacy. 8 As described
below, the law of standing is complex and indeterminate.
For our purposes indeterminate complexity occurs when complexity adds to,
rather than clarifies, indeterminacy. While complexity and indeterminacy often coincide,
complex systems are not necessarily indeterminate. Complexity will sometimes add
granularity and certainty. In this regard it is when indeterminacy and complexity run
together that we should be most concerned: such a system has the many disadvantages of
complexity, without any concomitant benefit of certainty or specificity.
8

The relative failure of this effort, however, may be evidence that it is harder than one might think to
increase determinacy with complexity. Consider McCaffery’s (1990) discussion of indeterminacy,
taxpayer behavior, and “dynamic complexity” in the creation of IRS regulations.
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The complexity literature offers general accord on three points. American law is
often too complex, it is growing more complex over time, and this complexity growth is
on balance harmful. (see, e.g., Epstein 1995; D’Amato 1983; Ruhl 1996). 9 I think it is
clearly true that insofar as the law drifts towards indeterminate complexity, that drift is
harmful. (see, e.g., Hadfield 2000). 10 The most obvious expense is in transaction costs.
When the law is complicated individuals need to hire lawyers to help decode it. When
the law is complicated and indeterminate consumers receive the worst of all worlds – the
expense of seeking legal advice without any clear answer about how to proceed. This
may explain why so many entrepreneurs plow forward without legal advice for as long as
possible. Rather than pay for expensive advice that offers few actual answers it’s better
to act now and hope for the best. (Sylvester, Menkhus, and Granville 2005).
I am also persuaded that American law grows more complex over time. I am not,
however, arguing that we are facing a “complexity crisis,” or that law is more
complicated than ever before. To the contrary, while the term “legal complexity” is of a
relatively recent vintage, recognition of the underlying phenomena is hardly new. 11
Charles Dickens’ Bleak House (Dickens 1853 [1980]) offers a particularly compelling
portrait of a legal system out of control, buried beneath layers upon layers of complexity.
The indeterminacy of law has been a persistent thread of the legal realist movement
9

To the empirically minded these citations will look a little thin. The empirical work on legal complexity
has been relatively limited. Michael Heise has an interesting study of the perception of complexity by
judges, lawyers, and juries in criminal cases (Heise 2004). There has also been some empirical work on
complexity in contracts drafting. (Eggleston 2000). Harris has published a study of citation rates in
Supreme Court cases he termed complex, and the study was replicated in New Zealand’s courts by Russell
Smyth. (Harris 1985 and Smythe 2003). None of these studies, however, demonstrate relative or growing
complexity. Danièle Bourcier and Pierre Mazzega are planning an international measure of comparative
complexity, but it appears to be in the design stage at present. (Bourcier and Mazzega 2007).
10
As with anything else, legal complexity has its defenders. (Wright 2000).
11
For reasons of brevity and relevance I am not canvassing the interesting recent work utilizing
complexity, evolutionary and chaos theories to describe legal change, because they tend to describe
systems of change, and not growth in complexity. (See Hornstein 2005; Ruhl 1996). Nor am I discussing
the recent empirical work on complexity in private law transactions. (Eggleston 2000).
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(Singer 1988, p.470), and later the critical legal studies movement. (See, e.g., Kress
1989; Leiter 1995).
2.2

Previous Studies of Indeterminacy and Legal Complexity

I discuss both indeterminacy and complexity below because my theory addresses
situations where they overlap. Studies of complexity and indeterminacy naturally
implicate economic and other analytical descriptions of the creation of law. Richard
Posner and William Landes have argued that legal precedent is similar to capital stock.
The capital stock of precedents depreciates over time, creating uncertainty. This
uncertainty leads to additional litigation which replenishes the capital stock and decreases
uncertainty, and the cycle begins again. (Landes and Posner 1976).
This theory has been subject to two criticisms which are useful to the analysis
here. The first is to question whether more litigation does, in fact, lead to precedents that
decrease uncertainty, or whether it just adds additional layers of complexity and
uncertainty. 12 The second is whether Landes and Posner ignore the interests and
activities of a key third party: lawyers. Paul Rubin and Martin Bailey have argued that
the uncertainty and complexity of products liability law is a direct result of the interests
of the lawyers who litigate those cases. (Rubin and Bailey 1994). 13
Anthony D’Amato’s Legal Uncertainty was one of the first attempts to explicitly
connect the incentives of the players in the legal system to ever-increasing indeterminacy.
He concluded that “Legal certainty decreases over time. Rules and principles of law

12

There is a split on this question. For example, Gennaioli and Shleifer assume that new precedents
naturally increase the precision of legal rules. (Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007). By comparison, Hadfield
argues that there is a natural entropy to legal complexity. (Hadfield 2000; see also Hadfield 1992).
13
Lynn LoPucki has also added substantially to the literature considering the role of lawyers in law
creation. (See LoPucki 1996; LoPucki and Weyrauch 2000).
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become more and more uncertain in content and in application because legal systems are
biased in favor of unravelling those rules and principles.” (D’Amato 1983, p.1).
D’Amato noted that potential litigants had an incentive to change their behavior in
response to law to try to find “gray areas,” where law’s application was unclear. He
argued that judges “desire status, fame, and greatness in their profession. Routinely
following precedent and always acting predictably do not often lead to notice and
acclaim.” Likewise, the incentives of lawyers and litigants favor uncertainty: “The
mathematical theory of gambler's risk, recently elaborated into ‘prospect theory,’
suggests that a person disadvantaged by the application of a legal rule has a greater
incentive to avoid the rule than the person advantaged by it has to affirm its application.”
In sum, D’Amato argued that the legal system as a whole has a structural bias in favor of
uncertainty and complexity.
Peter Schuck followed up on these insights with his own study of legal
complexity. He similarly argues that legal complexity is growing and deleterious. He
expanded upon D’Amato’s analysis of institutional incentives by focusing on the benefits
of complexity for legislators and their staffs, bureaucrats, litigants, lawyers and judges.
Each of these players has reason to favor complex and/or indeterminate rules. Complex
rules allow much more freedom to each player in the system and less accountability,
because it is costly for the public to decipher or lobby against complex systems. (Schuck
1992, pp.27-35)
Schuck does not use the language of public choice, but it should be clear that
complexity is an important tool in the arsenal of self-interested government officials,
whether legislators, bureaucrats or judges. Complexity allows each of these officials to
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pursue their individual goals under cover of an opaque legal system that the public cannot
disentangle. If an aggrieved member of the public wishes to change an area of the law
she must first decipher it, and then try to understand exactly which government actor or
actors are responsible for the situation at hand, and then lobby for change. 14
Schuck adds a second valuable insight – the craft value of complexity. All of the
players in the legal system enjoy looking smart and building what they see as elegant and
complex solutions to problems. Nevertheless, Schuck does not focus on why the craft
value of complexity would be especially hard to resist for law-making judges, a subject I
cover below. 15
3.

WHY LAWYERS AND LAW-MAKING JUDGES FAVOR COMPLEXITY
This Part argues that lawyers and judges both have strong incentives to increase

legal complexity. I separate these reasons into two categories, crass and subtle. Public
choice theory helps illuminate the crass considerations and the new institutionalism
explains the subtle. I may be too kind to my colleagues, but I tend to think the subtle
explanations actually better explain the complexity dynamic than the crass.
3.1

The Crass

Public choice theory is the application of economic analysis to non-economic
behavior. When applied to government decision-making each governmental actor is
independently rational and seeks to maximize personal utility. Thus, the easiest way to
14

In my previous work on judicial control of the regulation of lawyers I noted the substantial obstacles
between the public and lobbying for a change in lawyer regulation. The first such barrier would be
determining exactly who to contact, since State Supreme Courts control the regulation, not the legislature.
15
One humorous aside about both D’Amato and Schuck’s treatment of complexity is the large role they
ascribe to legal scholarship in the trend towards complexity. (D’Amato 1983, pp.21-22; Schuck 1992,
pp.34-38). More recently Robert Spitzer has blamed law reviews for faulty constitutional interpretation.
(Spitzer 2008). As I argue below, I do think that law professors and law schools are among the causes of
legal complexity. But in light of the current trend of judges and practicing lawyers largely ignoring legal
scholarship (Edwards 1992) it seems particularly solipsistic to claim that a professorial taste for complexity
in scholarship has done anything more than decrease readership.
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understand a governmental action is to consider the underlying institutional and
individual incentives involved. Public Choice theory has also been used to show how
narrow interest groups triumph in the political realm over more diffuse public interests.
Interest groups are able to deliver the things that legislators desire: campaign
contributions, votes, and assistance through lobbying. By delivering these items interestgroups can “purchase” self-interested regulations or laws.
Because courts are less open to lobbying than legislatures some public choice
theorists have assumed that judicial decision-making is less affected by interest group
pressures. (See Cross 1999 pp.358-60 for an exhaustive list). Nevertheless, a review of
judicial behavior towards the legal profession well establishes that judges are hardly
immune from external pressures on their decision-making, especially when those
pressures come from the legal profession. (Barton 2003; Barton 2007; LoPucki 2005).
As such, I usually find it useful in considering the public choice prediction of
judicial behavior to begin with the incentives of the legal profession, because those
incentives usually explain judicial behavior. Lawyers have multiple reasons to favor
complexity. First and foremost, across the legal profession lawyers are selling a single
good – technical expertise of the legal system. The more complicated that system is (and
that includes procedural and substantive complexity) the more business there will be for
lawyers. 16
If the system were to grow simpler, usage of lawyers would tumble, and that is
true regardless of the subject area involved. Consider the push towards non-lawyered
mediation (whether electronic systems such as Ebay’s or in-person mediation) as a less
expensive and simpler system of dispute resolution. Litigants have moved towards these
16

Hadfield 2000 and 2007 is particularly persuasive on this point.
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less formal dispute resolution mechanisms to avoid the expense and complexity of
traditional court proceedings. 17
Seen in this light complexity is a classic result of Public Choice theory. Lawyers
are a well organized interest group that pushes for beneficial law (in this case
complicated law and procedure) at the expense of the public at large. Public debates over
legal complexity bear this out: whenever non-lawyers complain about the legal system,
lawyers fall back to claims of unique institutional knowledge. “Of course the legal
system is complicated. If you were a lawyer you would understand why it must be so.” 18
It’s also worth noting how lawyers add legal value to litigation. Lawyers add
value by finding applicable precedents and law, and then either distinguishing or
applying them through a process of case law synthesis. Regardless of whether precedents
are to be distinguished or embraced, overall complexity assists. Having multiple
overlapping precedents or multi-factor tests always allows a lawyer room to find good
precedent and distinguish bad precedent. This is especially so because a lawyer can
almost always distinguish her case on the facts. In this regard lawyers build snowflakes:
they are trying to make each case unique and sui generis.
Gillian Hadfield has likewise argued that the American lawyer’s dedication to
zealous advocacy on behalf of individual clients virtually guarantees an effort to build
complexity, and ignore the broader benefits of simplicity. (Hadfield 2000). 19 If a more

17

The Ebay online dispute resolution system is particularly on point. Because of issues of personal service
and jurisdiction it is very complicated for a citizen in one state to sue a citizen in another state, especially if
that state is far away, and the amount at issue is relatively small. The Ebay system moots all of that
complexity in favor of simple, effective and cheap online mediation. (See Rule 2002).
18
This is true even in relatively simple and straightforward areas of the law like divorce and bankruptcy.
At the low end most of this law and procedure is very simple, but most jurisdictions require lawyers to file
the paperwork and prosecute the cases, even when a lay advocate or paralegal could certainly serve
adequately.
19
For a broader discussion of the corrosive effects of lawyer instrumentalism, see Tamanaha 2006.
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complex solution will suit a lawyer’s client that is the rule the lawyer will suggest,
regardless of the overall effect on the law. The sum total of each of these individual case
decisions in favor of complexity snowball across the system leading naturally to entropy.
Complexity is not, however, generally good for society as a whole, or legal clients
specifically. Nevertheless, because of informational asymmetry and agency costs clients
are not usually in a position to advocate for a simple result over more complexity in any
given case, let alone across the law in general. 20 Moreover, note the unique nature of the
collective action problem. On the whole, complexity is a great detriment to the
purchasers of legal services. But on an individual basis, complexity can be a client’s best
friend, especially if an able lawyer utilizes that complexity towards a better individual
case result. 21 Thus it is not just that an individual incentive towards sloth overwhelms a
group benefit: in legal complexity the individual choice in favor of complexity actually
carries an individual benefit.
Complexity would not, however, seem like it would much benefit courts.
Complex systems are harder to administer, so perhaps courts should serve as a natural
barrier to complexity. As the growth in legal complexity shows, this has not proven to be
the case, and a study of judicial incentives and behavior helps explain why.
There are multiple reasons for judges to follow lawyers and favor complexity.
The first is that the courts that are most affected by complexity – trial courts – are not the
courts generally responsible for its creation. Law-making appellate courts are in charge
20

A great example of this gap is the tort reform efforts. It’s worth noting that as a general rule these
reforms have focused on damages caps or jurisdictional controls, and not fundamental reform of the law.
Damage caps and jurisdictional changes do limit the overall losses in litigation, but they do little to reign in
indeterminacy or complexity, which remains untouched. In this way the defense lawyers are still quite
necessary to defend these cases.
21
This phenomenon is also reflected in surveys that show that the public has a generally unfavorable
impression of the legal profession as a whole, but a favorable impression of any individual lawyers that
worked for them. (Berenson 2006, 67-68).
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of creating precedential complexity, and complexity only affects them the next time that
issue appears on appeal. These courts are not on the front line of deciphering or applying
complexity. (For a particularly evocative description of this effect by a Federal Judge,
see Jacobs 2007).
Second, lawyers favor complexity consciously and unconsciously, and selfinterested judges will always work in accord with the desires of lawyers, the repeat
players in the system, and the judiciary’s main customers and patrons. The lawyers that
eventually become judges have good reason to favor their former profession. Most
judges remain members of bar associations and remain close professionally and
personally with their former colleagues after joining the judiciary. (Barton 2003).
Moreover, between the ABA, State Bar Associations, and donations to the
campaigns of elected judges, lawyers are easily the most influential group in the selection
and retention of judges. Lawyers give the bulk of the campaign donations to elected
judges. In elective states – including merit selection states with retention elections – bar
associations frequently endorse judicial candidates, and conduct and publish “bar polls”
on the judges. Many justices were selected for their positions through “merit plans” that
place substantial selection authority in state and local bar associations. Lastly, the ABA
has always played a critical role in the selection of federal judges. (Barton 2003). With
lawyers involved at every level of the process the likelihood that a judge will owe her
position to lawyers is extraordinarily high.
Lynn LoPucki offers a breathtaking example of the influence of lawyers over
judges in Courting Failure. (LoPucki 2005). At the behest of local bankruptcy
attorneys, bankruptcy courts across the country are competing to attract the largest and
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most complicated bankruptcy cases. Note that the “winner” of this competition wins a
great deal of new and complicated work. Nevertheless, pressure from local lawyers and a
desire to do the work itself have resulted in blatant forum shopping and competitions
among the judges on procedural and substantive law, all to the great benefit of the local
bankruptcy bars that can attract the biggest (and most lucrative) bankruptcies. (LoPucki
2005).
Third, just as complexity has benefits for the legal profession as a whole, it carries
great benefits for the law-making judiciary as well. Complexity makes it easier to decide
almost any case in line with the judge’s other preferences. (Miller 2008). Scholars who
advocate models of judicial behavior that focus upon non-legal explanations for judicial
behavior, like the attitudinal model or critical race scholars, have thus often looked to
complexity as the cover for true judicial motivations.
Fourth, while complexity does have costs, lawyers do a great deal of every
judge’s work. In the advocacy system most judges rely on the lawyers to do the bulk of
the work in trying, briefing, researching, or investigating cases. When the system is
working properly the judges sit back and decide cases based on the legal and factual work
of the lawyers. 22
On appeal the lawyers generally find and research the law, place it in written
briefs, and then apply it to the facts at hand for the judges. As such, complexity arrives
for the judge hand-wrapped by the litigants. Judges can, of course, disregard the lawyers’
legal research or theories of the case. But insofar as that requires independent research or

22

This aspect of the judicial incentive structure has led directly to higher barriers to entry – including
requiring law school and a passing grade on the bar exam – because judges and current lawyers both profit
when entry tightens. Lawyers profit from decreased competition and judges profit from better lawyers to
work up their cases. (Barton 2003, pp.1189-92).
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a novel legal outcome (and in many cases a simplification of the law would be novel)
substantial additional work is required, and the judge risks the opprobrium of other
judges or the legal profession. Thus, paradoxically, a judge seeking simplicity will have
to work much harder than a judge who applies the complex theories and law presented by
the lawyers in the case.
Fifth, while innovation in almost all areas of legal practice and judging has been
painfully slow, 23 one area of a judge’s work – writing opinions – has been greatly
streamlined by word processing technology. One hundred years ago it took substantial
physical effort to write or edit a legal document. Even forty years ago judges worked
through multiple drafts, hand-writing their changes in an effort to reach a final edit.
Word processors have revolutionized this process, so a physical barrier to complexity
(the hassle of committing it to paper) has been removed.
Lastly, as noted below, law-making judges like complexity. It’s likely that they
were good at complexity as lawyers, and it is likely why they sought a job as a judge in
the first place.
3.2

The Subtle

One of the key insights of the new institutionalism is that human behavior is
bound by “institutions.” The new institutionalism defines institutions broadly as “formal
and informal rules that constrain individual behavior and shape human interaction;
institutional environment varies with a person’s position in society.” (Eggertsson 1996,
p.7). 24 Institutions are groups constrained by defined behaviors and thought patterns. By

23

Gillian Hadfield has recently argued that the regulation of lawyers itself has stifled legal innovation and
costs consumers of legal services a great deal. (Hadfield 2008).
24
Consider Douglass North’s definition as well: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or,
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” (North 1990, p.3).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1136372

contrast, “organizations” are groups of people working together, like the judiciary or a
legislature.
Legal thought itself is a powerful and constraining institution. Before considering
how it affects judges, it is worth describing the career path of the law-making judge in
America and how it leads inexorably to a taste for complexity.
The first stop is law school. Justice Frankfurter once opined that “the law is what
the lawyers are. And the law and lawyers are what the law schools make them.”
(Frankfurter 1929). The stated goal of American law school, to teach law students to
“think like a lawyer,” is a quite explicit attempt at institutionalization. American law
schools are aimed at the study (and celebration) of indeterminacy. In class and exams
students are repeatedly presented with an unclear area of the law and asked to argue both
sides of the issue. “Thinking like a lawyer” requires a student to see each issue as multifaceted, and to recognize that the law likely does not have a clear answer for the
questions raised in class or on the exams.
Students are instructed that for class and exams the important point is not to find
the “right” answer, because there likely is no right answer. Instead, students are taught
and graded on their thinking process: did they spot all of the potential issues? Once they
spotted the issues, did they correctly analyze them, and note the different ways the law
could apply? I have previously called this approach to teaching law “the siren song of
indeterminacy.” (Barton 2004). Law school’s continual focus on gray areas is a
specialized training in complexity, and the students who are best at it end up with the best
grades and the highest credentials exiting law school.
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Law schools are not, however, irrational to focus upon indeterminacy. The next
stop for almost every law-making judge is practice. As noted above, coping with
complexity and indeterminacy is much of what lawyers are paid to do.
The lawyers who are selected to be law-making (i.e. appellate) judges come from
the elite of the profession. (Stempel 1998, p.808). 25 As members of this elite, these
lawyers have mastered the skills involved in the creation and understanding of legal
complexity. 26 Furthermore, it is likely that they actually quite enjoy the entire process.
When lawyers, judges, or law professors talk about a “true love of the law,” they are
talking about this exact process of digesting and generating complexity.
In addition to the sorting process of law school and practice, it is worth noting the
power of self-selection for law-making judges. Many, if not most, of these judges have
not taken their jobs for the money. Most earned or could earn more in private practice. It
is likely that some chose the work for prestige, or job security (for judges appointed for
life), or for a lighter workload, but there is another substantial non-economic benefit to
becoming a law-making judge: the work itself.
American Judges who hear appeals have jobs that are radically dissimilar from the
jobs of most lawyers or even district court judges. Law-making judges spend the vast
majority of their time reading briefs, researching the law, and writing opinions. They
hear oral arguments, but on a limited schedule and basis. They have very little contact
with the public at large. As much as possible they delegate unpleasant or managerial
tasks to staff and focus on the “fun” part of their job: legal reasoning and deciding cases.
25

For example, graduates of elite law schools are disproportionately represented on the federal bench.
(Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 [2003]).
26
As support for this contention, consider that a study of federal appellate judges that found that most selfidentified “innovators” (those judges more comfortable with judicial lawmaking) had attended prestigious
law schools, while most “interpreters” had not. (Howard 1981, pp.167-68).
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(Carrington 2007). Law-making judges thus spend almost all of their time engaged in the
hermetic pursuit of legal complexity, a true “life of the law.”
Every lawyer who becomes a judge knows what the job entails, and it is thus quite
likely that they at least think they will enjoy it. A big part of the non-pecuniary benefit of
the law-making judge is the pleasure (or “craft value” to use Schuck’s terminology) that
lawyers gain from legal complexity.
This helps explain why the “costs” of complexity don’t deter law-making judges.
To law-making judges complexity isn’t a bug; it’s a feature. If complexity means that
later interesting appeals raising new and different legal questions in the same complex
area will arise in the future, that is sauce for the goose.
It is also worth noting the ways that complexity fits the judicial interest in
“prestige,” which generally means how they are perceived among lawyers and other legal
elites. (Schauer 2000, pp.627-31; Jacobs 2007). Complex thinking and writing is held in
high esteem by lawyers, legal academics, and other judges. The more a judge is able to
display a mastery of those skills the higher her concomitant prestige. This, in turn, raises
the likelihood of judicial promotion, or other prestige-related benefits.
Paul Campos has also noted that an instinct as innocuous as the instinct to get
each case right results in crippling complexity. “The emphasis on getting it right, and the
agonized struggle to define just what that might entail, produce a distinctive vision of law
that is totalizing, relentless, and most oblivious to such crass considerations as time,
money, and possible limits to the powers of human reason.” (Campos 1998 p. 20).
Richard Epstein likewise noted the problem of seeking “perfect justice” in individual
cases. (Epstein 1995).
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A combination of the crass and subtle leads to the following prediction: the law
will be most complex in areas where a) elite lawyers regularly practice; b) judges may
have a personal preference in the case that can be written-around by way of legal
complexity; and c) the subject area interests the judge, or is generally considered
prestigious. Areas staffed by elite lawyers tend towards complexity because elite lawyers
tend to be the best at complex legal reasoning, and elite lawyers tend to have clients who
can pay for additional complexity. If the area overlaps with an area of the law that the
judge has a personal preference in, judges will bend towards complexity as a way to
justify their decisions. Lastly, “prestigious” or interesting areas tend to exacerbate these
other factors.
There are some obvious complex areas that fit these criteria, with constitutional
law the clearest. Many lawyers became appellate judges specifically out of a desire to
hear, think about, and decide complex constitutional cases. When those former lawyers
get their chance to decide these cases reducing complexity is the last thing on their mind.
In sum, a brief review of the backgrounds, incentives, and proclivities of both
lawyers and law-making judges establishes a strong, systemic bias towards complexity. I
personally place more weight on the unconscious factors rather than a conscious bias, 27
but regardless, the drift towards complexity is clear.
This is not to suggest that this drift is completely one-sided or that reform efforts
are impossible. The reform of civil pleading requirements embodied by the current
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that complexity (like any other interest

27

This may show my own personal bias as well. The political scientists who have advocated the
attitudinal model of judging (that judges decide their cases on the basis of political affiliation/preference
instead of legal reasoning) are continuously shocked that lawyers and law professors defend the integrity of
the judiciary, even in the face of contrary empirical evidence. (Segal and Spaeth 1993).
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group benefit gained by the logic of public choice and collective action theory) has
boundaries, and that if the situation grows sufficiently grave it can be rolled back.
(Subrin 1987). 28
4.

CASE STUDY – THE LAW OF STANDING
In my third year of law school I was fortunate enough to be selected for a

clerkship on the United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit. When I received
the clerkship one of my professors advised “Take our Federal Courts course in the
Spring. It’s the hardest class in law school, but you’ll need it for the clerkship.” I asked
around the law school and this was indeed the scuttlebutt – everyone who had a clerkship
was going to take the class, and it was extremely difficult material. The Federal Courts
course thus embodied my complexity theory. It was filled with future “elite” lawyers
(those who had federal clerkships) and involved the study of some of the most complex
and complicated law in America.
The Federal Courts course covers the role of the federal courts in the federal
system, with a particular focus “on standing and other justiciability questions; power of
Congress to define the scope of federal court jurisdiction; state sovereign immunity;
abstention; interjurisdictional preclusion and injunctions; and appellate and collateral
review, including habeas corpus.” 29
The course was as advertised, and the cases were quite difficult to digest.
Nonetheless, I found I had quite a different reaction to the material than my classmates
28

Of course, in American law simplification revolutions are often short-lived. Christopher Fairman and
others have persuasively argued that notice pleading (the main simplification effort of the Federal Rules of
civil Procedure) is currently dead for all practical purposes. (Fairman 2003).
29
This quote comes from the Vanderbilt Law School catalogue (see
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/academics/curriculum/elective-courses/federal-courts-and-the-federalsystem/index.aspx). This course description is consistent with that of other elite law schools. (See, e.g.,
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/courses/details/283/Federal%20Courts/)
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and the professor, who seemed enthralled by the onion-like layers of complexity. It
struck me as odd that a set of cases drafted by the finest judges in the land (U.S. Supreme
Court Justices) based on law almost wholly within the Justice’s control (i.e. constitutional
or federal common law) would be so convoluted and complicated. I had a true
“emperor’s new clothes” moment that semester, as I came to realize that smart people
working on hard problems do not always reach simple, or even good, solutions. Often
smart people working on hard problems produce a vast quantity of unnecessary
complexity.
The law of standing was one of the prime offenders in Federal Courts, and as such
it helps elucidate both the crass and subtle explanations for legal complexity. Standing
governs when an individual may sue in court. Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits
the federal judicial power to hearing “cases” or “controversies.” The Court has used
these terms to limit the types of cases federal courts may hear. Standing – along with
ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine – help define when a plaintiff may
bring suit in Federal Court. 30
The Supreme Court has announced “three requirements that constitute the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing. First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an
injury in fact, which is concrete, distinct and palpable, and actual or imminent. Second, a
plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of some third party not before the court. Third, a plaintiff
must show the substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged
30

Ripeness asks whether the case is ready to be tried. Mootness asks whether the plaintiff still has an
interest in the case at issue. The political question doctrine asks whether the case raises issues of an
essentially political and non-judicial nature.
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injury in fact.” (McConnell v. Federal Election Com'n, 540 U.S. 93 [2003], at 225-26)
(internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).
In addition to the constitutional requirements there are a series of prudential
standing principles: “The general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal
rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint
fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” (Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 [1984], at 751) (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). 31 In
many of the standing cases the Court does not differentiate between whether the question
was prudential or constitutional. (Gottlieb 1994). Because prudential standing can be
over-ridden by Congress but Constitutional standing cannot the distinction is,
nevertheless, quite important. (Chemerinsky 1994, pp.57-58).
Each of the six tests listed above have sub-tests, and some have competing tests
that are used in some cases but not others. Take the very first of the three constitutional
prongs – injury. Erwin Chemerinsky separates the “injury-in-fact” requirement into two
related questions – did the plaintiff personally suffer the injury and was the injury
sufficiently concrete. (Chemerinsky 1994, pp. 58-65).
Even this division does not capture the multi-faceted nature of the “injury-in-fact”
determination, because it tends to bleed together. Take Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation (504 U.S. 555 [1992]). In Lujan the plaintiff, National Wildlife Foundation,
lost because no individual member of the organization alleged that she had traveled to the
31

Erwin Chemerinsky offers a slightly more readable definition of the prudential requirements: “First, a
party generally may assert his or her own rights and cannot raise the claims of third parties not before the
court. Second, a plaintiff may not sue as a taxpayer who shares a grievance in common with all other
taxpayers. . . . Third, a party must raise a claim within the zone of interests protected by the statute in
question.” (Chemerinsky 1994, p. 58).
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specific land at issue. Justice Scalia wrote Lujan, and in addition to the narrow holding
requiring a visit to the affected land, he stated a quite firm requirement that
environmental plaintiffs state a “concrete and particularized” injury and set forth
“specific facts” to support their claims, not just generalized harm from environmental
degradation. (Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 [1992], at 560-65). Thus Lujan had both a “personal”
injury aspect (did the plaintiff personally visit the affected land) and a “concreteness”
aspect (was the alleged injury concrete and particularized enough).
The concreteness portion of Lujan, however, was later over-ruled, or substantially
watered down, by Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., (528 U.S. 167
[2000]). Friends of the Earth found standing where a plaintiff alleged visiting the actual
polluted river at issue, but could not allege an injury concrete enough to satisfy Justice
Scalia, who wrote a scathing dissent. (528 U.S. 167 [2000], at 198-215). As such,
Friends of the Earth upheld the “personal” aspect of Lujan, but allowed a lesser showing
on the concreteness question, all without explicitly over-ruling anything that came before.
The funny thing about this very, very brief description of one small corner of
standing law is that even this black-letter and bare bones description of the law is
bewildering, and I have made almost no effort whatsoever to describe or synthesize the
cases themselves. I have not, because standing cases have been called “notoriously
inconsistent,” 32 a “jumbled mess,” 33 “a quagmire,” 34 a “chaotic collection of rules and
standards,” 35 “confused,” 36 and “incoherent.” 37 As a further example, a Westlaw search
32

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. (127 S.Ct. 2553 [2007], at 2574) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
33
(Ferejohn and Kramer 2002, p.1010).
34
(Engel 2006, p.389).
35
(Staudt 2004, p.671).
36
(Cohen 1995, p.743).
37
(Hessick 2008, p.276).
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of all law reviews for the term “standing” in the same sentence as “complex” or
“complexity” results in 1299 documents. 38
There are several reasons why standing law is a great case study for the
complexity theory laid out above. First, while standing may be virtually unknown
outside of the legal profession, it is critically important to litigants. If a person is willing
to suffer the expense and hassle of bringing a lawsuit in Federal Court, it is of
tremendous importance that they not get bounced from court for lack of standing. 39
Standing is also an invaluable tool for federal courts, because it is one of the main ways
for courts to get rid of cases they do not like short of a decision on the merits.
Second, standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine are all
fully within the control of the Supreme Court, and to a lesser extent the lower federal
courts. None of the complexity in this law comes from Congressional actions, or bad
legislative drafting, or overweening bureaucratic enthusiasm. Standing is a purely
judicial doctrine, created as a gloss on two words (case and controversy). This means
that the judges involved have no one to blame but themselves for complexity and
indeterminacy.
Third, standing is one of those areas of the law where it is obvious that the
complexity involved is not the kind that leads to clearer application of the law on a more
individual basis, i.e. standing complexity is not of the sort that might confer a benefit
along with its costs. To the contrary, as standing law has grown more complicated its

38

I searched for “standing /s complex complexity” in the JLR database.
The expense and hassle of litigation are one of the most persuasive arguments against standing doctrine:
if the Court is really worried about entertaining litigation where the litigants who do not truly care about
their “case” or “controversy,” the willingness to litigate alone should be strong evidence.
39
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application has grown increasingly cumbersome and its applicability to any given set of
facts has grown even harder to predict.
As noted above, this makes standing a valuable area of the law for lawyers. For
any given Federal environmental or group rights case there is the strong possibility of a
challenge to standing. Because of the confusion in the law this challenge will require a
substantial amount of legal work for all the litigants, and it will allow clever lawyers to
craft and re-craft highly technical arguments on either side of the issue.
Fourth, standing law well establishes the value of complexity for judges. As
noted above, standing and related doctrines are an easy route for judges to get rid of cases
they do not like, either because of political preferences or a distaste for the litigants or the
subject area. Richard Pierce argues that lawyers can predict standing decisions “with
much greater accuracy if they ignore doctrine and rely entirely on a simple description of
the law of standing that is rooted in political science: judges provide access to the courts
to individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges.”
(Pierce 1999, pp. 1742-43). 40 Standing is the perfect case for the complexity theory
because the law is sufficiently complex that a judge has great discretion to decide
whether or not to find standing, and yet still has plenty of complexity to cover her
hindquarters in a learned written opinion or order.

40

Pierce establishes this argument as follows: “Five Supreme Court decisions issued between 1991 and
1998 illustrate the accuracy of the political scientist's description of the law of standing. In those cases, the
Court resolved standing disputes applicable to environmentalists (two cases), employees, prisoners, and
banks. In each case, the Justices divided either five-to-four or six-to-three on the standing issue. In each
case, the “votes” of the Justices were as easy to predict as the votes of their ideological counterparts in the
legislature. Liberals voted to grant access to the courts to environmentalists, employees, and prisoners, but
not to banks. Conservatives voted to grant access to banks, but not to environmentalists, employees, or
prisoners. Of course, in each case, all the Justices claimed to reach their politically preferred result through
objective application of legal doctrines. The applicable doctrines are so malleable, however, that it is
impossible to avoid the inference that the Justices manipulated the doctrines to rationalize their politically
preferred results.” (Pierce 1999, p. 1743).
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Fifth, standing also shows how judges are drawn to, and enjoy, complexity. The
Supreme Court has returned again and again to standing in the last thirty years, with each
new foray seemingly further muddying the waters. The cases are often split, and they
frequently involve lengthy dissents and multiple concurrences. In short, there is little to
suggest that the Justices dislike standing law, or that they see any particular need to
clarify, avoid, or scrap it. To the contrary, the standing cases look to be the work of legal
technicians and theorists who are enjoying themselves.
In short, the law of standing fits both the public choice and institutional analyses
of the judicial bias towards complexity. It also perfectly fits the predictive portion of this
paper: it involves an area where judges want flexibility to decide cases based on their
own preferences, an area (generally constitutional cases or group challenges to federal
action or statutes) that draws elite lawyers, and it’s an area of interest for the judges.
V.

Conclusion
At this point I hope I have convinced you of several points. First, lawyers and

lawyer-judges have special institutional and public choice reasons to favor complexity in
arguing and deciding cases. Complexity benefits lawyers by creating more of a market
for legal services, but more importantly, the crafting and creating of complex legal
arguments are what many lawyers most enjoy about the practice. This is especially so for
the lawyers who enjoyed and succeeded in law school. These same lawyers then become
law-making judges. They continue to enjoy complexity as the very heart of the legal
process. Further, it allows judges legal cover to decide cases in line with their personal
preferences.
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The question of what, if anything, can or should be done about the problem,
however, is harder to tackle. One hope is that judges will recognize the costs of
complexity and adjust their behavior accordingly. Given the judicial taste for multifactor balancing tests and complicated procedures this result seems rather unlikely.
There is an old adage that hard cases make bad law. A corollary might be that interesting
cases make unnecessarily complex law.
The problem is that any more fundamental changes require a radical reworking of
the American Justice System. Adrian Vermeule has argued that at least some Supreme
Court Justices should be non-lawyers. (Vermeule 2007). In order to avoid complexity,
however, it would seem necessary to either retrain lawyers before becoming judges,
separately train judges, or select judges from among both lawyers and non-lawyers. It
would of course be necessary to consider the other costs and benefits of any such move.
Institutional change should never be advocated in a vacuum, as we are always choosing
between several sub-optimal options. (Komesar 1994). Nevertheless, there is reason to
believe that the very structure of the legal and judicial professions may be contributing to
our case of “hyperlexis,” which Bayless Manning defined as America's “national disease
– the pathological condition caused by an overactive law-making gland.” (Manning
1977, p.767).
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